Abstract -This paper introduces a permutation generation mechanism based on a shared secret key. The generated permutation vectors are used as encryption keys in a stream ciphering cryptosystem. We investigated various types of attacks on the known stream cipher RC4 and patched most of its loopholes, especially biased-byte and state-related attacks. Unique to our approach, we prove mathematically that the complexity of bruteforcing such a system is (2n), where n is the key size in bytes. This paper also presents a complete security model using permutation-based encryption, in order to handle privacy. In addition, our approach achieved higher performance than that of existing peer techniques, while maintaining solid security. Experimental results show that our system is much faster than the existing security mechanisms, such as AES and DES.
I. INTRODUCTION
A permutation describes an arrangement, or ordering, of objects [1] . Many algorithmic problems seek the best way to order a set of objects, including traveling salesman (the least-cost order to visit n cities), width (order the vertices of a graph on a line so as to minimize the length of the longest path), and graph isomorphism (order the vertices of one graph so that it is identical to another). Any algorithm for solving such problems must construct a series of permutations along the way.
There are n! permutations of n items, which grow exponentially to generate all permutations. Numbers like these should calm the urge of anyone interested in exhaustive search and help explain the importance of generating random permutations.
Fundamental to any permutation-generation algorithm is a notion of sequence order, the sequence in which the permutations are constructed, from first to last. The most natural generation order is lexicographic, the order in which permutations would appear if they were sorted numerically. Lexicographic order for n = 3 is {1, 2, 3}, {1, 3, 2}, {2, 1, 3}, {2, 3, 1}, {3, 1, 2}, and finally {3, 2, 1}. Although lexicographic order is aesthetically pleasing, there is often no particular reason to use it. Indeed, nonlexicographic orders lead to faster and simpler permutation generation algorithms [1] [2] .
The generation of random permutations is important for simplifying security algorithms. One way to do this [3] is the following two-line, linear-time algorithm. We assume that Random(i,n) generates a random integer between i and n.
for i  1 to n do a i  i /* a =(1, 2, ..., n)*/ for i  1 to n do swap(a i , a Random(i, n) ) It is not obvious that this algorithm generates all permutations uniformly. However, the validity of a security algorithm that is based on such linear generation of permutation vectors is yet to be proven in relation to peer algorithms. Permutations are also used to achieve -diffusion‖, a critical characteristic of a secure cipher [4] , in symmetric-key encryption algorithms such as DES [5] , Twofish [6] and Serpent [7] . Some permutations in cryptographic algorithms are not one-way only. For instance, the Expansion Permutation in DES maps some bits in the source data vector to multiple destinations in the result data vector [8] .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a description of the RC4 stream cipher with some flaws that made it insecure. In Section 3, we propose a permutation technique to be used in building secure stream ciphers. The base theorem of our crypto system is presented in Section 4 as well as some useful lemmas. Section 5 presents in detail the theorem proof which covers all cases of forming a new permutation vector. Our SDES crypto system is briefly presented in Section 6. Section 7 shows some simulation experiments and comparison of SDES with the state-of-the-art security mechanisms in terms of throughput. The conclusion is given in Section 8.
II. RELATED WORK
Stream cipher algorithms are an important class of encryption techniques. They encrypt individual characters (usually binary digits) of a plaintext message one at a time, using an encryption transformation that varies with time [9] . In contrast, block ciphers tend to simultaneously encrypt groups of characters of a plaintext message using a fixed encryption transformation [10] . Stream ciphers are generally faster than block ciphers [11] and have less complex hardware circuitry. They are also more appropriate, and in some cases mandatory (e.g., in some telecommunications applications), when buffering is limited or when characters must be individually processed as they are received.
RC4 is one of the dominant stream ciphers used in secure data communications [12] . Ron Rivest of RSA Data Security Inc developed the RC4 cipher in 1987, the details of which were published in 1996. RC4 is a stream cipher encryption system, which uses a shared key to shuffle a permutation vector, S, and randomly selects elements from it to encrypt and decrypt messages transferred during a particular communication session [13] .
RC4 consists of two parts, as shown in Figure 1 . The first is a key-scheduling algorithm, KSA, which turns a random key (whose typical size is 40-256 bits) into an initial permutation vector S of {1, …, n}; the second is a pseudo-random generation algorithm, PRGA, which uses S to generate a pseudo-random output sequence. There are several methods of attempting a brute force attack on RC4 that are classified into two categories: KSA-based attacks and PRGA-based attacks. Knowing that the initial state is enough to predict all of the keystream bits (regardless of the shared key K), PRGAbased attacks look for contradictions in the chosen keystream (in order to detect incorrect guesses) and discover some of the initial state entries. There has been considerable analysis of the probabilities of any given value being output by RC4. Most of these analyses have approached RC4 by looking at a given output.
KSA(K):
Even though RC4 uses a permutation vector as its internal state box, the generated keystream is not necessarily redundancy-free. Fluhrer and McGrew [14] and Mantin and Shamir [15] defined a class of predictive states in which a non-negligible bias appears in the keystream. In their search for a polynomial-space distinguisher, they came up with a startling theorem, claiming that if S 2 = 0 and S 1 ≠ 2, then z 1 = 0 with probability of 1.
In a good keystream generator, each bit of the output will depend on the entire key for its value; the relationship between the key and a given bit (or set of bits) should be extremely complicated [9] . However, RC4 uses the shared key only once (in the KSA); the shared key is not involved at all in the keystream generation. Recall that at each step of the PRGA, S changes in, at most, two locations; thus we can still expect the prefix of the output stream generated by RC4 from some permutation, S, to be highly correlated with the stream generated from the same S (or a slightly modified one) by RC4 [12] .
III. PROPOSED PERMUTATION VECTOR GENERATION
The generation of permutation vectors can be performed recursively. Given a permutation vector PV j (a vector that contains all elements from 1 till n, in a specific order), the generation of the next permutation vector PV j+1 is based on PV j and some other parameter that provides randomness. Our goal is to generate a large set of PVs whose sequence order is difficult to guess. In fact, the shared secret key (SK) utilization, in swapping the elements of PV, captures the notion of randomness in the abovementioned algorithm. Next is our linear algorithm to generate permutation vectors:
/* 1 SK i  n */ The major advantage of using permutation vectors as encryption keys is the avoidance of biased byte analysis, in contrast with RC4 keystreams. In accordance with good keystream philosophy, an entry in the new generated permutation vector is a function of the entire key and the previous permutation vector, i.e., every bit in the new permutation vector is generated after performing exactly n swaps in the previous vector.
Another major contribution of our permutation generation algorithm is the continuous involvement of the shared key in the permutation vector generation. This will render the state-based attacks obsolete, since the attacker is forced to obtain the state and the key together in order to break the system. In order to increase the level of security, the system should update the shared key internally after each record. Therefore, the attacker is compelled to break a system with pseudo-multiple keys, instead of a single static key.
Most of cryptographic schemes are based on the -reducibility from hard problems‖ technique, which consists of proving that any successful protocol attack leads directly to the ability to solve a well-studied hard problem [11] . This -reference‖ problem is considered computationally unfeasible, given current knowledge and an adversary with bounded resources, e.g., the -integer factorization‖ and the -discrete logarithmic‖ problems. Such analysis yields the so-called provably secure protocols, although the security is conditional on the reference problem's being truly difficult. On the contrary, we will show that a cryptanalyst is cornered to the bruteforce option only in order to guess the lexographic order of the generated permutation vectors. Hence, we will prove a theorem that underlimits such brute-force algorithmic complexity to an exponential function (2 
C. Reduction function
A reduction function Reduction(V) of a permutation vector V of size m+1, is a function that reduces V to a permutation vector of size m as follows (illustrated in Figure 2 ): 
D. Index map function
The index map IMAP X,V corresponding to two permutation vectors X (of size m) and V (of size m or higher) is defined as follows (illustrated in Figure 3 This theorem provides theoretical strength to cryptosystems in a way that a cryptanalyst who managed to obtain two consecutive encryption keys (permutation vectors), which is not an obvious task, will find it very hard to break the system and guess the secret key (2 m possibilities) that is indispensible to calculate the next encryption keys.
A. Lemma 1
Given an index map function IMAP X,V of two permutation vectors X and V, IMAP X,V remains unchanged when swapping any two elements in X and V; swap( , ) on X and swap( , ) on V, where 
V. THEOREM PROOF
The proof of the above mentioned theorem is obtained simply by induction, which is based on proving the base case and the induction step. Table I shows that there are 2 1 = 2 different keys K that permute V into W, for any permutation vectors V and W of size 2.
A. Base Case: m = 2
[1, 2] [2, 1] [1, 1], [2, 2] [2, 1] [2, 1] [1, 1], [2, 2] [2, 1] [2, 1] [1, 2], [2, 1]
B. Induction Step
Given two permutation vectors V and W of size m+1, we will prove that there are 2 m keys that permute V into W, assuming that for any two permutation vectors X and Y of size m, there are 2 m-1 keys that permute X into Y (inductive hypothesis).
Given In this section, we will investigate a methodology to build keys that permute V into W, where the element m+1 moves backward. First, we will construct 2 m-1 keys based on the inductive hypothesis. Then we will deduce a second set of 2 m-1 keys that basically permute a different vector Vr to a different vector Wr, where m+1 still moves backward from Vr to Wr, and prove that these keys also permute V into W.
First set of 2 m-1 keys Based on the inductive hypothesis, there are 2 m-1 keys that permute X into Y. Also, there are 2 m-1 keys that permute X into Z. Since X is the reduction of V and Y is the reduction of W, we will try to construct 2 m-1 keys of size m+1 from the existing 2 m-1 keys that permute X to Y. Unfortunately, this process will fail, as we will show later.
Note that V has all elements of X plus an extra element, m+1, and W has all elements of Y plus an extra element, m+1. We will consider a key K X→Y from the 2 m-1 keys that permute X into Y. We will try to expand K X→Y into a larger key of size m+1 with the property of permuting V into W. Therefore, the permutation algorithm based on the expanded key (here, K V→W ) has basically two tasks: (i) permuting the X elements inside V into the Y elements in W, and (ii) moving the value m+1 from position p 1 to position p 2 . We will work on task (i) separately, and ignore the fact that m+1 is migrating from p 1 to p 2 . Practically, we will set the entry of index p 1 in the key K V→W to be equal to p 1 itself (Figure 8) . Hence, the permutation of V based on K V→W will skip the -moving‖ of m+1. Then, we fill the rest of the K V→W entries from K X→V sequentially, as follows: (Figure 10 ). In fact, will equal . 
The second side effect is that, at the end of the permutation algorithm, the elements of the resulting vector between position p 2 +1 and p 1 will be rotated to the left, compared to the expected W.
Hence, we failed to obtain W by permuting V using K V→W , which was constructed based on K X→Y . Had we selected a mysterious permutation vector identical to Y, except with the element range between p 2 and p 1 -1 rotated right by one step, we would have obtained our target W (Figure 11 ). This mysterious vector is exactly Z. Therefore, we can generate Here is a three-step algorithmic depiction of the above discussion:
Step 1
Step 2 
Also, = m+1, based on (5), and = m+1 based on the induction step. Therefore:
At this stage, we have proved that the constructed key K V→W does permute V into W. Therefore, given that there are 2 m-1 keys that permute X into Z (based on the induction hypothesis), we can expand them to generate 2 m-1 keys that permute V into W, following (2), (3) and (4) (see example in Figure 12 ). 
Reduction Reduction
Keys that permute X to Z:
Step 1 {(1, 1, 1), (2, 2, 1)}
Step 2 {(1, 1, 1), (2, 2, 1)}
Step 3 { (1, 1, 1 ) return wTemp Since wTemp was reversed at the beginning of the above function, the returned vector will be also reversed at the end of execution, i.e., wTemp will be identical to Vr instead of V.
The above function looks like a typical Permute() function, except for the second parameter of swap(). For this matter, we will construct a new key K WrVr as follows: (6) And similarly, ̂
Therefore, the above algorithm will look like:
return wTemp which is identical to Permute(Wr, K WrVr ), which results in Vr.
Thus, we found a relationship between keys that permute V into W, and keys that permute Wr into Vr, referring to (6) and (7) . Therefore, if we could generate keys that permute V into W, we could easily infer the same number of keys that permute Wr into Vr, and vice versa. Since = = m+1, then, = = m+1. Then, we can set two new positions ̂ and ̂ to be and , respectively. Since p 1 is greater than p 2 , then ̂ is also greater than ̂ . Based on the previous section, there are 2 m-1 keys that permute Wr into Vr, since ̂ > ̂ . We will consider a key K WrVr from this set. Then, based on (7), we can infer a new key ̂ that permutes V into W. Consequently, we can infer another set of 2 m-1 keys in this manner.
Now, we will show that ̂ does not belong to the first set of 2 m-1 keys that we generated previously. For this purpose, we will choose a key, K V→W , from the previously generated keys (first set).
We know that ̂ , when i < ̂ , based on (2) and (3).
Therefore,
, for j > p 2 . Hence, when j = p 1 , ̂ . But, for any key K V→W from the first set, we have , based on (2). Therefore, ̂ does not belong to the 2 m-1 set of generated keys.
To conclude this subsection: given two permutation vectors V and W of size m+1, where , and p 1 > p 2 , we constructed 2 m-1 keys that permutes V into W, and inferred a second, different set of 2 m-1 keys that also permutes V into W, for a total of 2 m keys (see example in Figure 13 ).
Hence, we finished the proof by induction for the case of (p 1 > p 2 ). 
Keys that permute Xr to Zr:
Step 3 { (1, 1, 1 
, which is a contradiction based on Lemma 2, since |{p 1 , …, m+1}| > |{p 1 +1, …, m+1}|.
So, based on Lemma 3, there exists j 1  p 1 where j 1 > IMAP V,W (j 1 ) = j 2 , and = = v 1 . Then, we will construct a permutation vector, ̂, of size m+1 as follows:
And another permutation vector ̂ of size m+1 as follows:
In other words, we perform swap( , ) in V to get ̂, and swap( , ) in W to get ̂ (Figure 15 ). ii. If i = t and j  t, then a and b will swap to position j inside aTemp and bTemp, respectively, after executing the i th loop. iii. If i  t and j = t, then a and b will swap to position i inside aTemp and bTemp, respectively, after executing the i th loop. iv. If i  t and j  t, then a and b are not involved at all in the i th swap operation. Therefore, a and b will remain in their position t inside aTemp and bTemp, Next, we will choose a key ̂ ̂ from the 2 m keys that permute ̂ into ̂ and observe the result of Permute(V,
̂ ̂)
. For this purpose, we will run Permute(V, ̂ ̂ ) and Permute( ̂ ̂ ̂, ) in parallel, as shown in Table V . 
We know that Permute( ̂, ̂ ̂ ) results in ̂. We will use Lemma 4 to show that Permute(V, ̂ ̂ ) also results in W, i.e., at the end of Permute(V, ̂ ̂ ), vTemp will be identical to W. We will consider all elements of vTemp and ̂ at Phase I ( and
ii. If = m+1 at Phase I, then ̂ = v 1 , based on (8) . At Phase III, ̂ = ̂ = v 1 , based on (9). Therefore, = v 1 , based on Lemma 4.
iii. If ≠ v 1 or m+1 at Phase I, then = ̂ , based on (8) . Thus, at Phase III, = ̂ , based on Lemma 4, when ̂ ≠ v 1 or m+1 (1  k  m+1). Therefore, = ̂ , when k ≠ v1 or m+1, based on (9).
Based on (10), (11) and (12), vTemp is identical to W at Phase III.
Hence,
̂ ̂ permutes V into W. To conclude this sub-section: given two permutation vectors V and W of size m+1, where = = m+1 and p 1 < p 2 , we constructed two new vectors ̂ and ̂ of size m+1, where ̂ = ̂ = m+1 and j 1 > j 2 . Based on (case (a)), there are 2 m keys that permute ̂ into ̂. Ultimately, we proved that these keys also permute V into W (see example in Figure 16 ).
Then, we finished the proof by induction for the case of (p 1 < p 2 ). 
which is a contradiction based on Lemma 2, since |{p 1 +1, …, m+1}| > |{p 1 +2, …, m+1}|.
Notice that Lemma 5 is another version of Lemma 3, but it is not necessary to find an element moving backwards. Therefore, two cases are to be discussed:
1. Figure 18 ). (1, 1, 1), (2, 2, 1), (3, 2, 2), (3, 3, 3 keys that permute V into W (or V). We will choose a key K V→W for comparison purposes. We need to find another set of 2 m-1 keys that permute V into W. Notice that we cannot use the same methodology of case (a), because the argument presented to prove that the new set of keys is different than the one constructed at case (a) is not valid in case p 1 = p 2 .
Instead, we will try to come up with a second pair of identical permutation vectors ̂a nd ̂, and we will show that the keys that permute ̂ into ̂a lso permute V into W.
if p 1 1:
We will construct a permutation vector ̂ (also identical to ̂) of size m+1 as follows:
̂ {
In other words, we perform swap( , ) in V to get ̂ (also swap( , ) in W to get ̂) . Therefore, ̂ and ̂ are also two identical permutation vectors of size m+1. Following the same steps for constructing the keys in case (a), we obtain 2 m-1 keys that permute ̂ into ( , ) . In other words, instead of two idle swaps, we will swap the elements twice at position p 1 (which is m+1) and position p 1 -1, which will cancel the swap effect. Based on the latter, we can modify the key ̂ ̂ to be: Figure 19 ).
if p 1 =1:
Following the same methodology of Section 2.1, we can proceed in the proof by setting ̂ as follows (using p 1 +1 = 2 instead of p 1 -1):
Hence, we finish the proof by induction for the case of (p 1 = p 2 ). Figure 19 : Constructing a set of four keys that permute (1, 2, 3) to (1, 2, 3) To conclude this subsection: given two permutation vectors V and W of size m+1, where = = m+1, we constructed 2 m -1 keys that permute V into W based on case (a), and inferred a second different set of 2 m-1 keys
Step 1 {(1, 2, 3), (2, 1, 3)}
Step 2 {(1, 2, 3), (2, 1, 3)}
Step 3 {(1, 2, 3), (2, 1, 3)} W = (1, 2, 3) Keys that permute X to Z:
Step 1 {(1, 2, 2), (2, 2, 1)}
Step 2 {(1, 2, 3), (3, 2, 1)}
Step 3 { (1, 2, 3 1, 1, 1), (2, 2, 1), (3, 2, 2), (3, 3, 3 
VI. SECURITY MODEL: SYNCHRONOUS DYNAMIC ENCRYPTION SYSTEM (SDES)
SDES is a stream cipher cryptosystem based on permutation vector generation [16] [17] [18] . The encryption function is simplified in order to minimize the overhead cost. Thus, a simple XOR is performed between the data record d j and one of the generated permutation vectors PV j , resulting in a cipher c j to be transmitted (Figure 20 (a) ). The decryption function is performed in the same manner as the encryption function. The cipher record c j is XORed with the same permutation vector PV j (generated at the recipient side), producing the original data record d j (Figure 20 (b) ). Then, a new permutation vector is generated (PV i+1 = Permute(PV j , SK)) to be used in the next encryption/decryption operations. Notice that the first permutation vector to be used in encryption PV 
A. Static shared key
This option provides a low security profile; compromising two consecutive PVs will break the entire system, since the corresponding IMAP between PV j and PV j+1 is identical to the IMAP of PV j+1 and PV j+2 . Therefore, this option is used only with the assumption that a cryptanalysis is unfeasible (e.g., transmitted data are proportionally limited).
B. Stream of shared keys
In order to alleviate the previous security loophole, a second option is also provided to modify the shared key after each data record encryption, for more IMAP dynamics. Practically, we perform SK j+1  SK j + PV j before generating the next permutation vector PV j+1
. Then, the shared key generation is not vulnerable to -biased byte‖ analysis since the involved permutation vector is a good source of byte diversity. However, in the event that more than one encryption session is opened (in parallel or at different times), the same stream of shared keys is generated, lacking security independence between sessions; i.e., breaking one session breaks all.
C. Session-based stream of shared keys
For ultimate security, the communicated data is involved in the shared key generation, as a third option. . Hence, a different sequence of shared keys is generated in every session (assuming that sessions are of different communication data).
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A prototype simulation of our technique proved to run two to three times faster than the-state-of-the-art AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), DES (Data Encryption Standard), and Triple DES (Figure 21 ). Using the NS2 simulator (version 2.26), we designed a topology of five nodes connected to a router that routes packets to a sink node through a duplex connection of 1 Mbits/s maximum capacity. Each of the four nodes tries to send an exponential generated traffic data to the sink passing through the bottleneck 1Mbits/s connection. The first node sends non-encrypted packets. The second, the third, the fourth and the fifth nodes send packets securely, encrypted with AES, DES, 3DES, and SDES, respectively. Figure 21 shows that SDES (using the dynamic stream of shared keys option) achieves a maximum throughput of 896 Kbits/s. This result proves the higher efficiency of our SDES algorithm compared to other peer techniques (AES: 409 Kbps, DES: 528 Kbps, and Triple DES: 112 Kbps). The reason for achieving such better performance is the simplicity of our encryption/ decryption function, since the function complexity is shifted to the dynamics of the key management (i.e., the permutation vectors generation).
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a simple mechanism to generate permutation vectors (based on a random secret key) is introduced for data encryption. Unique to our technique, we proved that 2 m-1 different secret keys have the same effect on the generation of the next encryption key. Hence, even if an intruder (hypothetically) compromises two consecutive encryption keys, he is cornered to bruteforce a massively huge key space (for m = 256). Moreover, the involvement of the entire permutation vector in the encryption process results in a much more diverse stream of keys than those of RC4, avoiding staterelated attacks.
We also presented a cryptosystem implementation that utilizes permutation vectors in the process of encryption as well as in key management. Experimental results (using the NS2 simulator) showed that our security system outperformed peer security mechanisms, e.g., AES and Triple DES, due to the simplicity of both encryption and key management functions.
Future work is related to the diversity of IMAPs between consecutive encryption keys. On average, there is a chance of 1/n! for two subsequent secret keys to yield the same IMAP. Hence, it would be useful to investigate mechanisms to enhance secret key management in order to assert such diversity. 
